Protecting the Goal: Stadium Security Preparations for the 2026 World Cup

As North America prepares to host the 2026 World Cup, the first in the U.S. since 1994, the upmost attention—federally and locally—is being given to security amid a backdrop of geopolitical tensions.

Each of the 2026 World Cup matches hosted in the U.S.—78 in total—will be designated as National Special Security Events (NSSE) for their international significance and potential of criminal or terrorist activity. Mexico and Canada, hosting 26 combined matches, are expected to employ similar protocols. All three countries must adhere to the safety and security policies set by the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

The National Special Security Event (NSSE) designation centralizes security operations under federal direction for nationally significant events at increased risk of attack. The legislation was in part driven by the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics pipe bombing incident that sent shockwaves through the country about event safety.

U.S. security efforts are backed by a $625 million grant package from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The funding, distributed to local and state law enforcement agencies across the 11 U.S. host cities, is divided relative to the number and significance of the matches hosted at each venue. For example, Florida received the largest sum of funding ($73.7M) as Miami is hosting matches for the round of 32, quarterfinals and third place clash.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which oversees FEMA, did not approve funding until March 11 due to a partial government shutdown, delaying financial timelines by months. The town of Foxborough, MA, the site of New England Patriots’ Gilette Stadium, threatened to forego hosting World Cup matches, stating they desperately needed $7.8 million in security funding.

Simply put, the host cities of the World Cup could not afford the security investment needed for an event of this scale without federal funding, which can be used for everything from staffing to infrastructure improvements. Local and state authorities will still be responsible for the bulk of security operations.

World Cup security escalates in a pyramid model, with the tournament progressing with higher profile matches and ultimately the final. As stakes increase, so do security measures taken to ensure the safety of spectators. If key government officials attend matches, security would only intensify. Matches between countries enduring international conflicts may also have higher risk profiles regardless of match significance.

Security officials view potential threats from the customer experience, considering everything that could be vulnerable to threat actors, even before the match: ticketing, transportation and hotels. Within venues, officials must look at all aspects of the operational technology and IT environment, big and small. As discussed in Kroll’s stadium security considerations breakdown, the interconnectivity of these systems poses a real challenge: security is not just physical, it is a data and cyber issue.

Coordination across agencies and teams, such as a security control center, bomb squad and hazmat crews is paramount for a well-executed operation that properly addresses all potential gaps in security. All systems intermesh with each other, necessitating the need for joint operation centers that can measure threats coming in. Oftentimes, an Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) is created as a centralized committee to protect against cyber and physical threats.

Officials for the 2026 World Cup will be on high alert as the largest World Cup in history, with an expanded 48-team format, comes amid conflict in the middle east. The greatest threats to public safety are not necessarily from threat actors attempting to enter the country; terroristic messaging and propaganda can inspire lone actors already in the U.S. Threats—even without action—can also perpetuate panic and chaos.

Host cities, which have been vetted as having the necessary security infrastructure, are incentivized to take on an opportunity of this scale to prove their viability for future events that could prove more profitable. Los Angeles, for example, will be using their crowd management tactics as a trial run for the 2028 Summer Olympics.

When the first match kicks off on June 11, supporters and players can feel assured that multiple years of security preparations will protect the safety of the world’s largest sporting event.  The large security investment correlates with the complexity of potential physical and cyber attacks.

Kroll serves as an expert security advisor across the entire stadium security landscape, with deep knowledge of the interconnectivity of physical and cyber risks. In addition to becoming the outside security director for events, Kroll can provide guidance to organizations, pre-screening capabilities and VIP protection for high-net worth individuals.